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Section 59 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law provides for liability of the owner
whose vehicle was used with his permission by another person. In Traub v.
Divzler,' involving this section, the Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate
Division,2 held that when liability is purely statutory and predicated on ownership
of a motor vehicle within the purview of section 59, the owner is entitled to
recover over against his actively negligent bailee and the latter's employee-driver.
This section, which imputes the negligence of the driver to the owner, was
enacted to remove the hardship of the common law rule by preventing the owner
from escaping liability by saying that the car was not used in his busirjess.
8
However, the statute may not be invoked to impute the driver's negligence
to the owner in actions other than those brought by a third party against the
owner; 4 thus a negligent bailee cannot escape liability to the owner for any damage
done to the latter's car.5 In a recent case it was held that section 59 did not bar
the bailor of a negligent bailee from asserting a cause of action for common law
indemnification against the owner and operator of the other automobile involved
in the collision.
0
Prior to the decision in the instant case, a lower court case held that in an
action for wrongful death suffered when a truck struck the intestate, the third-
party complaint could be maintained by the owner of the truck against the
company by which the truck was hired at the time of the accident, since vicarious
liability imposed on an owner by statute leaves him with a claim against the active
wrongdoer's employee.
7
The refusal of the Court in the instant case to impute the driver's negligence
to the owner, where indemnity is sought by the latter, is consistent with the
intent of the Legislature in enacting section 59. In this case the Court of Appeals
1. Traub v. Dinzler, 309 N. Y. 395, 131 N.E. 2d 564 (1955).
2. Traub v. Dinzler, 284 App. Div. 969, 134 N. Y. S. 2d 620 (2d Dep't 1954).
3. Palumbo v. Ryan, 213 App. Div. 517, 210 N. Y. Supp. 225 (2d Dep't 1925).
4. Mills v. Gabriel, 259 App. Div. 60, 18 N. Y. S. 2d 78 (2d Dep't 1940), afj'd
284 N. Y. 75, 31 N.E. 2d 512 (1940).
5. Kurzon v. Union, By. Co. of New York City, 172 Misc. 37, 14 N. Y. S. 2d
530 (City Ct. 1939).
6. Petro v. Eisenberg, 207 Misc. 380, 138 N. Y. S. 2d 705 ( Sup. Ct. 1955).
7. Roscher v. Cecere, - Misc.--, 132 N. Y. S. 2d 840 (Sup. Ct. 1954); See
also Elliott v. Flushing Sand & Stone Co., Inc., 273 App. Div. 782, 75 N. Y. S. 2d
333 (2d Dep't 1947).
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did not pass upon a brand-new point of law, but rather re-affirmed previous cases
so holding.
8
Statutory Duty of Subcontractor
In an action by an employee of a general contractor against an excavating
subcontractor, the latter impleaded the general contractor. The Court of Appeals,
affirming the Appellate Division's dismissal of the third party complaint, held
that the violation of the excavating contractor of statutory duty to provide shoring
and bracing9 rendered him an active joint tort-feasor, and as such not entitled
to indemnification.' 0
At common law, even in the absence of express agreement to indemnify, a
party guilty of passive negligence could implead a party actively negligent and
recover from him the full amount of the judgment paid to the injured plaintiff.1
Since the excavating contractor was no longer on the premises and the general
contractor was in exclusive possession and control, the subcontractor claimed that
he was at best only passively negligent, and thus entitled to indemnification.
In the Semanchuk case 12, which re-affirmed the holding of the Walters case,' 3
the Court abolished the distinction between active and passive negligence f6r
purposes of indemnity in cases involving violation of section 241 of the Labor
Law. The Court in both cases held that the section imposed a positive command
upon owners and contractors, violation of which rendered both active joint tort-
feasors not entitled to indemnity. In the Schwartz case14 the Court refused to
extend the rule enunciated in the above cases to fields not expressly covered by
section 241 of the Labor Law.
Regardless of whether or not a case involved violation of section 241 of
8. See Note 7 supra; Gorham v. Arons, 282 App. Div. 147, 121 N. Y. S. 2d
669 (1st Dep't 1953), aff'd mem. 306 N. Y. 782, 118 N.E. 2d 600 (1954).
9. N. Y. LABOR LAW §241 (6) The board of standards and appeals may make
rules to provide for the protection of workmen in connection with the excavation
work for the construction of buildings ..... .3 N. Y. OFFICIAL COMPILATION OF
CODES, RULES AND REGULATIONS DEPT. OF LABOR §23-4.4. The sides of every trench
excavation five feet or more in depth where . . there may be procured an unsafe
condition, shall be securely held by timber bracing....
10. Rufo v. Orlando, 309 N. Y. 345, 130 N.E. 2d 887 (1955).
11. Phoenix Bridge Co. v. Creem, 102 App. Div. 354, 92 N. Y. Supp. 855 (2d
Dep't 1905), affd' without opinion 185 N. Y. 580, 78 N.E. 1110 (1906).
12. Semanchuk v. Fifth Ave. d 37th St. Corp., 290 N. Y. 412, 49 N.E. 2d
507 (1943).
13. Walters v. Rao Elec. Equip. Co., 289 N. Y. 57, 43 N.E. 2d 810 (1943).
14. Schwartz v. Merola Bros. Construction Corp., 290 N. Y. 145, 48 N.E. 2d
299 (1943). The situation here involved some terrazzo bags piled on the sidewalk,
a situation not expressly covered by section 241 of the Labor Law.
